Daily Edition · Page 2

THE DAILY INDEX

Technology, AI, software, security, crypto and business

ATTACKS & VULNERABILITIES

TLDR InfoSec

250,000 IMPACTED BY DATA BREACHES AT NEW JERSEY, TEXAS HEALTHCARE FIRMS

Clover Health Investments said attackers used social engineering to compromise three employee accounts, exposing data on 138,677 people. AngMar Management Services found stolen patient data after suspicious activity, affecting 126,196 people. Exposed records included Social Security numbers, diagnoses, medical histories, insurance details, prescriptions, and service dates. The Interlock ransomware group claimed to have stolen 700 gigabytes from AngMar.

WORDPRESS LIBHEIF RCE: EXPLOIT CHAIN

Fortbridge has published the first public exploit chain for a libheif heap overflow (GHSA-x8r2-mggj-j6wr) originally discovered by Alex Thomas and Wordfence. By uploading crafted HEIC images via the WordPress Media Library, an authenticated attacker can defeat ASLR using pixel values in generated JPEGs and hijack a C++ virtual table pointer to achieve remote code execution. Administrators should update libheif to 1.23.3, disable unused HEIC/AVIF uploads, and treat repeated PHP-FPM 503 errors on image uploads as security events.

MCP FOR AGENT-TO-AGENT COMMS MAY BE THE RISKIEST PROTOCOL YOU'VE NEVER HEARD OF

Google and four other organizations acknowledged flaws over the past five months where a prompt injection landing on one AI agent over MCP was forwarded to other internal agents, which executed it on trust. Researcher Syed Anas Mohiuddin named the technique "protocol pivoting," though X41 D-Sec's Markus Vervier told Ars Technica it is plain indirect prompt injection. The bugs typically ended in SSRF, ranging from severity 2.7 at Rapid7 (CVE-2026-97228) to 8 in Google's mcp-toolbox, which followed redirects without validating target IPs.

NTS: AUTHENTICATED TIME AT META

Meta added Network Time Security (RFC 8915) to its public time service at nts.meta.com, so on-path attackers can no longer forge the clock that certificate, token, and replay-window checks rely on. Its servers hold no per-client state because each one derives the cookie-sealing key from a shared master secret and the Unix epoch day using HKDF-SHA256. NTS does not stop delay attacks or prevent an authenticated server from being simply wrong, and the stock Android and iOS time clients still sync over unauthenticated packets.

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