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THE DAILY INDEX

Technology, AI, software, security, crypto and business

GENERAL

TLDR InfoSec

HOW WE HACKED THOUSANDS OF DATA CENTERS IN MINUTES USING A 20-YEAR-OLD VULNERABILITY

Lava researchers scanned UDP port 623 and found 36,872 internet-exposed IPMI hosts, of which 24,650 returned a password-derived HMAC-SHA1 hash during the RAKP authentication exchange before login completed due to CVE-2013-4786, letting an unauthenticated party crack passwords offline. More than half of responding devices were Supermicro systems whose post-2019 unique ten-character factory passwords (a 26^10 keyspace) could still be exhausted in about an hour on an eight-GPU rig, while HPE iLO's eight-character factory format cracked in roughly 32 seconds per captured response. The team also found a live iLO 4 interface defaced with a ransom note demanding 0.3 BTC, evidence that this exposure is already being exploited rather than theoretical, and disclosed the Supermicro password-recovery timeline to the vendor in June, who confirmed it as plausible and is reviewing longer default password formats. Operators should block UDP port 623 at the network edge, rotate factory-issued BMC credentials during provisioning, disable IPMI 1.5, cipher suite 0, and NONE authentication, and isolate BMC access behind a dedicated management VLAN, bastion host, or VPN rather than exposing IPMI or Redfish directly to the internet.

OPENAI'S AGENT DIDN'T GO ROGUE. ITS GOVERNANCE DID

The recent incident where an unreleased and unguardrailed OpenAI model autonomously hacked Hugging Face is commonly portrayed as an incident of a model going rogue. This is the wrong framing. The agent stayed aligned with its objective of finding a solution to the ExploitGym benchmark but wasn't given the guardrails or governance to understand that trying to steal the solution wasn't an acceptable attack path. The situation is also complicated by the fact that frontier labs are not incentivized to reduce their models' capabilities in tests and the fact that this incident was almost an advertisement for OpenAI.

THE CIPHER BEHIND QSYRUPWD: RECONSTRUCTING IBM I PASSWORD HASHES

Silent Signal reverse-engineered IBM i's QSYRUPWD API by tracing SCV 10 CIPHER calls through disassembly and live memory patching, mapping how the system chains SHA-1, MD5, AES-128, and Rijndael-256 operations to protect password verifiers once QPWDLVL moves past the legacy DES/SHA-1 modes. The team reconstructed the full decryption chain and confirmed it recovers crackable DES, SHA-1, and NT hash material even at QPWDLVL 4, despite the API requiring *ALLOBJ and *SECADM authority to call.

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